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Abstract—The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)
released its first 5G security specifications in March 2018.
This paper reviews the proposed security architecture, its main
requirements and procedures, and evaluates them in the context
of known and new protocol exploits. Although security has
been improved from previous generations, our analysis identifies
unrealistic 5G system assumptions and protocol edge cases that
can render 5G communication systems vulnerable to adversarial
attacks. For example, null encryption and null authentication are
still supported and can be used in valid system configurations.
With no clear proposal to tackle pre-authentication messages,
mobile devices continue to implicitly trust any serving network,
which may or may not enforce a number of optional security
features, or which may not be legitimate. Moreover, several
critical security and key management functions are left outside
of the scope of the specifications. The comparison with known 4G
Long-Term Evolution (LTE) protocol exploits reveals that the 5G
security specifications, as of Release 15, Version 1.0.0, do not fully
address the user privacy and network availability challenges.
Keywords–Security, 5G, 3GPP Release 15, LTE
I. INTRODUCTION
The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) published
its fifteenth release of the mobile communication system
specifications in March 2018, setting the foundations for the
5th generation of mobile communication (5G). With ground
breaking upgrades at the radio layer, the New Radio (NR)
standard implements an advanced physical layer that supports
millimeter wave communications and antenna arrays for mas-
sive multiple-input, multiple-output (MIMO) systems [1]. In
parallel, the 5G core network (5GC) has been redesigned for
enhanced flexibility and service versatility. The goal of 5G
networks is to provide ubiquitous, high-speed, and low-latency
connectivity for enhanced mobile broadband, massive machine
type communication and real-time control. 5G will enable the
tactile Internet, untethered augmented and virtual reality, smart
connected vehicles and further new connectivity types [2], [3].
As with its preceding generations–2G, 3G and the 4G Long
Term Evolution (LTE)–, security is of capital importance for
5G networks and services. Cellular communication networks
provide connectivity to billions of civilians worldwide. They
are also the connectivity cornerstone for current and emerging
critical infrastructure, supporting the smart grid, first responder
units, and advanced military operations. The advent of 5G will
enable new verticals in the civilian, industrial and mission-
critical domains [3].
Motivated by the inherent security weaknesses of legacy 2G
networks, such as the lack of mutual authentication between
the network and the user equipment (UE), security has been
one of the key design considerations for mobile communica-
tions starting with 3G. LTE implements strong encryption and
integrity protection algorithms, backed with a mutual authen-
tication using symmetric keys that are securely stored in the
Universal Subscriber Identification Module (USIM) and the
operator’s Home Subscriber Server (HSS) [4]. Nevertheless,
a series of vulnerabilities inherent to the LTE protocol still
exist and have been identified by researchers over the last few
years. For example, a substantial number of pre-authentication
messages are sent in the clear, which can be exploited to
launch Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and obtain location
information of mobile subscribers [5]–[7].
The first release of the LTE specifications, 3GPP Release 8,
was published in 2007. The main security vulnerabilities were
not identified and reported in open literature until much later,
though. One of the reasons for this was the lack of available
and affordable tools for LTE security research. LTE open-
source software libraries running on personal computers and
using commercial off-the-shelf software-defined radio (SDR)
peripherals did not reach a sufficient level of maturity until
recent years. Once they became available, a wave of excellent
security research in the area of LTE mobile communications
emerged and identified numerous protocol vulnerabilities [5],
[7]–[10].
As in LTE, security is a key consideration and core aspect
for the definition and specification of 5G systems. Since the
inception of the communication protocols for NR and 5G-S
(5G System), there has been a substantial effort in addressing
known LTE protocol exploits, with particular focus on prevent-
ing International Mobile Subscriber Identifier (IMSI) catchers
or Stingrays [11]. As a result, the 5G protocol introduces the
Subscriber Permanent Identifier (SUPI), as replacement of the
IMSI, and a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which allows
the encryption of the SUPI into the Subscriber Concealed
Identifier (SUCI) [12].
Preventing protocol exploits that leverage pre-authentication
messages was also a key security design goal for 5G [13].
Nevertheless, and despite the efforts to design a secure archi-
tecture, a number of insecure protocol edge cases still exists.
Moreover, there is no clear solution yet to prevent the implicit
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trust of pre-authentication messages, which can be exploited
by an adversary to both deny the service to subscribers as well
as intercept sensitive user information [7].
If the PKI architecture that is used to conceal the SUPI is
also intended to prevent other protocol exploits, full security
against such exploits can only be achieved if all USIMs in
all mobile devices had the public keys of all operators in
the world. In addition, all operators would need to keep the
corresponding private keys well secured. Not only such key
management and rotation is unfeasible and, as of Release 15,
left outside the standard specifications, but political and opera-
tor disagreements would most likely result in the lack of global
adoption. Insecure protocol implementation and exploitation of
pre-authentication messages could be the consequences.
This paper provides a wide-angle analysis of the 5G access
network security architecture and procedures and its potential
deployment challenges as a result of the security framework
described in 3GPP TS 33.501 [12]. The underlying require-
ments and assumptions for 5G security are identified and
analyzed holistically, with specific focus on global adoption
and the resulting consequences. The objective of this paper is
not to provide a comprehensive analysis of the security of 5G
network elements and layers, but rather to globally assess the
critical security challenges of the current 5G security specifi-
cations with an outlook at future 5G network deployments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II provides an overview of the 5G security architecture and
components, setting the context for Section III, which dis-
cusses the main 5G security requirements and procedures of
the first 3GPP Release 15 specifications. Section IV provides a
holistic analysis of the deployment challenges of the proposed
5G security framework, highlighting the potential risk of pro-
tocol exploits and sensitive information leaks. The 5G security
framework is then analyzed in terms of the known LTE
protocol exploits in Section V. Finally, Section VI summarizes
our findings and proposes research directions to address the
identified security vulnerabilities.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE 5G SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
The 5G security architecture spans across the UE, radio
access network, core network and application [12]. The ar-
chitecture is correspondingly organized into an application
stratum, a serving stratum, and a transport stratum. Figure
1 shows a simplified diagram of the serving stratum and the
transport stratum. Different security features are defined across
the network and end user components, which combined create
a secure system design:
• Network access security (I): A set of features and mech-
anisms that enable a UE to authenticate and securely
access network services. UEs therefore exchange protocol
messages through the access network with the serving
network (SN) and leverage the PKI, where keys are stored
in the USIM and the home environment (HE).
• Network domain security (II): A set of features and mech-
anisms that enable network nodes to securely exchange
Fig. 1. 5G security architecture (AN–Access Network, HE–Home Environ-
ment, ME–Mobile Equipment, SN–Serving Network).
control plane and user plane data within 3GPP networks
and across networks.
• User domain security (III): A set of features and mech-
anisms at the UE that secure the access to mobile
equipment and mobile services. It establishes hardware
security mechanisms to prevent the mobile terminals and
USIMs from being altered.
• Service-Based Architecture (SBA) domain security (IV):
A set of network features and mechanisms for network
element registration, discovery and authorization, as well
as for protecting the service-based interfaces. It allows
new 5GC functions, which may be implemented as virtual
network functions, to be securely integrated. It also
enables secure roaming, which involves the SN as well
as the home network (HN)/HE.
• Visibility and configurability of security (not shown in
Fig. 1): A set of features and mechanisms that allow
informing users whether a security feature is in opera-
tion. It can also be used to configure security features.
The 3GPP 5G security specifications formally establish
optional security features and degrees of freedom for
implementation and operation, which means that 5G users
may encounter different security context.
Fig. 2. Simplified 5G reference network architecture.
The 5G specifications define a number of network functions
and their interfaces, enabling the data flow between the 5G
radio access network (RAN), 5GC, and external networks. Fig-
ure 2 illustrates a simplified 5G reference network architecture.
The network functions and security features specify a flexible,
yet secure design for developing 5G mobile communication
systems.
III. 5G SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES
The 5G security framework defines a series of security
requirements, features and procedures [12], which we sum-
marize in continuation. Table I captures the core security re-
quirements and the corresponding procedures for the 5G RAN.
This table highlights, in italics, some of the requirements
and procedures that can lead to security vulnerabilities. These
vulnerabilities and their potential implications are analyzed in
subsequent sections.
A. Key Framework
The 5G security procedures leverage a hierarchical key
derivation, distribution, and management framework. Keys are
stored in a number of network entities. The long term key
K is stored by the Authentication Credential Repository and
Processing Function (ARPF) of the Unified Data Management
(UDM) layer and the USIM holds the user corresponding copy
of that symmetric key. All other keys are derived from it. The
key generation and distribution is detailed in [12].
B. Authentication and Home Control
3GPP establishes the Extensible Authentication Protocol
for Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA) and 5G
AKA as the authentication methods that must be supported
by both the 5G UEs and the 5GC. 5G UEs use the SUCI in
their registration requests to initiate the authentication process
using the method they select. These security modes are used
for mutual authentication and subsequent service security and
encryption procedures. 5G AKA enhances the AKA protocol
of 4G LTE [4] by providing the HN with proof of successful
authentication of the UE from the visited network.
C. Security Contexts
The 5G security specifications define a number of security
contexts for different scenarios: a single 5G serving network
(SN), across multiple SNs, and between 5G and 4G networks.
When a UE is registered with two SNs, both networks must
independently maintain and use a separate security context.
When the UE is registered to two SNs in the same public
land mobile network (PLMN), 3GPP and non-3GPP, the UE
establishes two independent Non-Access Stratum (NAS) plane
connections with those networks, but uses a common NAS
security context consisting of a single set of keys and security
algorithms.
D. State Transition and Mobility
Procedures for maintaining or disregarding a security con-
text during state transition and handover are also defined, to
some extent, in [12]. The specifications state that it is up to the
operator’s policy how to configure the selection of handover
types. This decision is a function of the operator’s security
requirements, thus leaving the security during handovers as
an opt-in feature instead of enforcing it through the standard.
As a consequence, an operator could potentially implement an
insecure handover procedure.
E. Non-Access Stratum
Cryptographic separation and replay protection of two ac-
tive NAS connections is supported through a common NAS
security context, which has parameters that are specific to each
NAS connection. NAS uses 128-bit ciphering algorithms for
integrity and confidentiality protection. Note that both null
encryption and null integrity protection are supported. If the
UE has no NAS security context, the initial NAS message is
sent in the clear and contains the subscription identifier and
UE security capabilities, among others.
F. Radio Resource Control
The Radio Resource Control (RRC) integrity and confiden-
tiality protection is provided by the packet data convergence
protocol (PDCP) layer between the UE and gNB and no layers
below PDCP shall be integrity protected. Replay protection is
to be activated when integrity protection is activated, except
when the selected integrity protection algorithm is NIA0 (null
integrity protection). RRC integrity checks are performed both
at the UE and the gNB. In the case where a failed integrity
check is detected after the start of the integrity protection, the
concerned message shall be discarded.
G. User Plane
The Session Management Function (SMF) shall provide
user plane security policy for a protocol data unit (PDU)
session to the gNB during the PDU session establishment
procedure. If user plane integrity protection is not activated
for data radio bearers (DRBs), the gNB and the UE shall
not integrity protect the traffic of such DRB. If user plane
ciphering is not activated for DRBs, the gNB and the UE
shall not cipher the traffic of such DRB. The local SMF can
override the confidentiality option in the user plane security
policy received from the home SMF.
H. Subscription ID Privacy
The SUCI is the concealed version of the 5G permanent
subscription identifier SUPI. The SUCI is transmitted over
the air to prevent exposing the user identity in the clear.
It is constructed from the SUPI using the operator’s public
key and a probabilistic asymmetric encryption method to pre-
vent identity tracking. Nevertheless, the SUPI null protection
scheme is used for unauthenticated emergency sessions, when
so configured by the HN, or when the operator public key has
not been provisioned.
The 5G specifications also define a temporary identifier,
the 5G Global Unique Temporary Identifier (5G-GUTI), to
minimize the exposure of the SUPI or SUCI. 5G-GUTI is
to be reassigned based on UE triggers, but it is left to the
implementation to determine the rate of such reassignment.
TABLE I
5G RAN SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES (SECURITY DOMAIN ASSOCIATION ACCORDING TO FIG. 1).
Scope Security requirements Procedures
General
(I)
• Mitigation of bidding down attacks.
• Mutual authentication.
• UE, access and serving network authorization.
• Allowance for unauthenticated emergency services.
Authentication procedures us-
ing EAP-AKA and 5G AKA
authentication methods.
UE and
gNB (I)
• User and signaling data confidentiality protection through cyphering.
gNB triggered, considering UE security capabilities and SN’s list of se-
curity capabilities. Null encryption supported. Confidentiality protection
optional to use.
• User and signaling data integrity and replay protection. gNB triggered,
considering UE security capabilities and SN’s list of security capabil-
ities. Null integrity protection supported. Integrity protection of user
data optional to use. RRC and NAS signaling protection mandatory,
but exceptions exists, including unauthenticated emergency sessions.
Key derivation, distribution and
agreements from a key hier-
archy, supporting 128 bit key
and 256 bit key encryption. For
every key in a network entity,
there is a corresponding key in
the UE, with the root key stored
in the USIM.
UE
(III)
• Secure storage and processing of subscription credentials using a tamper
resistant secure hardware component.
• Subscriber privacy through use of temporary and concealed subscriber
identities (5G-GUTI and SUCI).
• If provisioned by the home operator, the USIM shall store the HN public
key used for concealing the SUPI.
Null-scheme supported and
shall be used when public key
not provisioned by HN, which
controls subscriber privacy and
the provisioning and updating
of keys.
gNB
(I), (II)
• Authorized setup and configuration by O&M through certificates, the
use of which is optional.
• Key management, optional for the 5G PKI-based architecture.
• Secure environments for keys, user plane and control plane data storage
and processing.
Authentication and key deriva-
tion may be initiated by the
network as often as the opera-
tor decides when an active NAS
connection exists.
IV. POTENTIAL VULNERABILITIES OF 5G—SECURITY
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
As introduced in Sections II and III, 5G mobile networks
implement a security architecture similar to that of LTE
systems, with a small difference in how trust and security is
established. Pre-5G communication systems base all security
functions on symmetric keys that are securely stored both in
the USIM and the HSS. Based on the shared secret key ks,
an LTE UE can authenticate the network and the network can
authenticate the UE. The encryption and integrity protecting
keys are derived from ks [4]. This symmetric key security ar-
chitecture results in the inability of a communication endpoint,
the UE, to verify the authenticity and validity of any message
that is exchanged prior to the NAS Attach cryptographic
handshake. The need for pre-authentication messages to be
sent in the clear is widely acknowledged as the root cause of
most known LTE protocol exploits [6], [7], [14].
For any communication protocol, including 5G, indepen-
dently of how strong a security architecture is and how
sophisticated its cryptographic algorithms are, it only takes
one single edge case or insecure function to defeat the entire
system. For example, although in LTE the IMSI should only be
sent in the clear the very first time a mobile phone is switched
on, there is a number of legitimate and explicitly defined use
cases in which the network can request that the UE identifies
itself using its IMSI.
Clear guidance through standardization and its enforcement
are the basis for global compliance. Security functions and
procedures that are left out of the scope of the protocol
specifications can result in insecure edge cases. Therefore,
critical security features and mechanisms cannot be optional
and all operators need to opt-in for implementing these and
implement them rigorously.
A. Pre-Authentication Message Exploits
The goal of the 5G security architecture is to tackle the
challenge of pre-authentication messages and other protocol
exploits [13]. By introducing the concept of operator public
keys, 5G systems provide the tools for establishing a root of
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF SECURITY AND IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES OF 3GPP 5G RELEASE 15.
Security/ implementation challenge Root cause Impact
PKI infrastructure Considered out of scope of the 3GPP
specifications
Implementation specific, potential for
not being implemented
Key management (rotation, over-the-
air provisioning, etc.)
Considered out of scope of the 3GPP
specifications
Implementation specific, potential for
not being implemented
Global cooperation Security against pre-authentication
message exploits guaranteed only if
USIM contains a public key for every
operator worldwide
With just one operator or country
being non compliant, system secu-
rity and user privacy can be compro-
mised through rogue base stations and
spoofed pre-authentication messages
Support for NULL encryption and
NULL integrity
Requirements from standards stake
holders and lawful interception work-
ing group
Potential for bidding down attacks and
rogue base stations, especially if no
public key provisioned for the operator
trust between the end user and the mobile operator under
the umbrella of the 5G PKI. Leveraging the public keys
burned into USIMs, operators can securely receive encrypted
messages from the UEs as well as sign messages with their
corresponding secret key to be validated by the UEs.
This PKI is the method that is proposed to protect against
Stingrays. However, there is no clear solution in the specifi-
cations on how to achieve such level of security against all
protocol exploits leveraging 5G pre-authentication messages.
The specifications fall short of an ideal full PKI architecture,
leveraging digital certificates and a Certificate Authority (CA),
to tackle such a security challenge. Moreover, although SUPI
catching is substantially more challenging than IMSI catching,
there is still a number of valid protocol edge cases in which
the SUPI is transmitted in the clear [12]. Therefore, a rogue
5G base station could potentially trick a UE into disclosing
its SUPI.
It is worth noting that in 5G there is no method to prevent a
rogue base station from instructing a UE to disclose its SUPI
leveraging a spoofed pre-authentication message. However, in
5G, the SUPI would be transmitted encrypted in the form of
the SUCI. Similarly, no security method in 5G prevents a UE
from implicitly trusting pre-authentication messages.
In order to avoid pre-authentication message exploits using
the 5G current PKI basic proposal, global compliance would
be necessary. That is, in order to verify the validity of
all pre-authentication messages in all connectivity scenarios,
including roaming, each UE would require a cryptographic
root of trust for any network it may connect to. This is so
because network originating messages such as AttachReject
and TAUReject, known for their LTE protocol exploits [6],
[7], could originate at the visiting network, as opposed to the
HN, while roaming.
A potential solution against pre-authentication message ex-
ploits would also require operators to load into all USIMs
and properly manage a public key for every operator in
every country, without exception. It is anticipated that some
countries will ban the public keys from certain other countries
or operators, something that has been observed before [15].
In general, protocol exploits like the ones disclosed in [7],
[10], [16] are, as of Release 15, Version 1.0.0, still possible
in 5G.
B. Other Security Challenges
The new security framework and architecture is considered
fundamental for securing emerging 5G mobile networks. How-
ever, our initial analysis of the security architecture already
highlights a number of remaining security weaknesses that
should be addressed. Table II identifies the key 5G secu-
rity challenges, their root causes and potential impacts. The
specifications leave outside of the scope of the protocol most
implementation details that are critical for security, such as
the key management of operator public keys residing in the
subscribers’ USIMs, the structure of certificates and how or
whether keys are ever rotated [12]. It is left for the industry to
figure those details out. Prior experience has shown that rapid
roll out and affordable service delivery require simple protocol
solutions, which oftentimes compromise security [17]. In
addition, lawful interception requirements mandate continuing
support for null encryption and null integrity protection, which
results in insecure modes of communication and protocol edge
cases.
Increased home control with respect to prior generations
is considered useful for preventing certain types of fraud.
The proposed 5G security framework supports implementing
such procedures, but they are considered beyond the scope
of the specifications: the actions taken by the home network
to link authentication confirmation (or the lack thereof) to
subsequent procedures are subject to operator policy and are
not standardized [12].
In addition to the aforementioned security challenges, re-
searchers are already finding weaknesses in the cryptographic
operations defined in [12]. The authors of [18] use formal
verification tools to analyze the 5G AKA algorithms and
demonstrate that the protocol fails in meeting several security
goals, which are explicitly required. The study also shows that
the 5G protocol lacks other critical security properties. The
studies presented in [19] and [20] reach similar conclusions.
Moreover, the authors of [21] describe potential downgrade
attacks against 5G networks.
C. PKI-Based Architecture Alternative
The move towards a PKI-based architecture in 5G is a
step in the right direction. PKI systems provide a wider
flexibility for sophisticated security solutions that could poten-
tially tackle, for example, the challenge of pre-authentication
messages. However, such a critical element of the 5G system
architecture should not be left outside of the specifications.
Global agreement and adoption of a large scale PKI archi-
tecture is necessary for fully addressing the security challenges
in 5G in the long term. However, instead of basing the
system on public keys burned into the USIM, an improved
architecture would include a global 5G Certificate Authority
(CA). The CA would act as the root of trust to authenticate
messages and communication based on digital certificates [22].
Such authority would provide a more flexible architecture,
and the corresponding certificate revocation and management
challenges have already been addressed and the solutions
vetted by the secure Internet implementation community [23].
Similar proposals about the potential of PKI-based archi-
tectures applied to mobile communication systems have been
discussed for over a decade now [24]. It is also an important
element of the European 5GPPP group [25].
V. IMPACT OF LTE PROTOCOL EXPLOITS ON 5G
The LTE security architecture was designed to address
the challenges of previous generations. The first generation
of mobile networks (1G) lacked support for encryption and
this was one of the main drivers for the introduction of 2G
digital mobile communications. Legacy 2G networks do not
support mutual authentication and use an encryption algorithm
that is outdated [26]. LTE implements specific functionalities
to guarantee the confidentiality and authenticity of mobile
networks and messages, using much stronger cryptographic
algorithms and explicit mutual authentication between the UE
and the eNodeB. This makes 4G LTE inherently more secure
than prior generations, yet still vulnerable to certain exploits.
A. LTE Protocol Exploits
The existence of LTE protocol vulnerabilities has been
known for some time, although these have not been publicly
discussed until recently. The openness of the standard, the
large community of researchers, and the broad availability of
SDRs, software libraries and open-source implementations of
both the eNodeB and the UE protocol stacks have enabled a
number of excellent LTE security analyses [5], [9], [10], [28],
[29]. Despite the stronger cryptographic algorithms and mutual
authentication, UEs and base stations exchange a substantial
amount of pre-authentication messages that can be exploited
to launch denial of service (DoS) attacks [6], [14], [30], catch
IMSIs [31] or downgrade the connection to an insecure GSM
link [7], [10]. Researchers also found new privacy and location
leaks in LTE [16].
The LTE protocol specifications also define vulnerable edge
cases that, despite being rarely executed, are still supported by
the protocol. For example, although it is very unlikely that a
UE would ever transmit an Attach Request message using its
IMSI as the identifier, the protocol describes specific scenarios
in which this would occur. For example, during network
recovery after the core network lost the UE’s temporary
identifiers. In this case, the network can trigger the mobile
device to retransmit the Attach Request message with its IMSI
in the clear [32].
In a nutshell, most active LTE protocol exploits occur
because of a combination of the protocol supporting inse-
cure edge cases and the implicit trust of pre-authentication
messages [6]. The first two columns of Table III summarize
some of the most relevant LTE protocol exploits that have been
identified in open literature in the recent past.
B. Impact on 5G Networks
Most of the known LTE protocol security vulnerabilities
were studied and dissected by the security working group of
3GPP [13] with the aim for defining a secure 5G standard. As
a result of that study, specific security goals for 5G mobile
networks were set to address the problem of IMSI catch-
ers, pre-authentication messages and location leaks. Device
and user tracking leveraging the Radio Network Temporary
Identifier (RNTI) [16] was, on the other hand, disregarded in
the 3GPP study because RNTIs are claimed to be short lived
identifiers that cannot be leveraged for privacy leaks. Recent
research, however, confirmed that the RNTI can be used to
track subscribers [5].
As discussed in this paper, despite being highly sophisti-
cated and robust against adversarial attacks, the 5G security
framework still includes a number of edge cases that facilitate
bypassing all security functions. Hence, most of the demon-
strated LTE protocol exploits are not fully addressed and are
still a potential threat, as described in the third column of
Table III.
These findings put pressure on 5G. Unlike in the case
of LTE, where most security research and resulting protocol
weaknesses were identified after the protocol was defined,
implemented and globally deployed, the security research
community is moving fast with 5G. Weaknesses in the 5G
specifications are being identified as the specifications are
released [18].
Note that most deployed LTE networks still rely on many
early 3GPP Release 8 or 9 features. This highlights that
once deployed, after years of standardization, certification
and testing, major network upgrades can take considerable
time to be widely implemented, for a variety of reasons.
Since security cannot be considered an add-on feature, the
advantage of providing early awareness of potential security
issues is that these can be pragmatically analyzed, fixed, and
the specifications revised during the initial roll outs and before
mass commercial deployments of networks, UEs, and services.
TABLE III
MAJOR LTE PROTOCOL EXPLOITS AND THEIR IMPACT ON 5G.
LTE protocol exploit Threat Impact on 5G
IMSI catching Privacy threat, location leaks,
SS7 leaks, etc. [6], [7], [10],
[27]
Potential for IMSI/SUPI catching in some protocol edge
cases, such as when an operator does not implement op-
tional security features or when an unauthenticated emer-
gency call is maliciously triggered.
Attach/ Tracking Area
Update (TAU) request
DoS [6], [7], [10] DoS of 5G mobile devices exploiting pre-authentication
messages with rogue base station broadcasting a valid Mo-
bile Country and Network Code (MCC-MNC) combination
for network with no public key provisioned in the USIM.
Silent downgrade to
GSM
Man in the middle attacks,
phone call and SMS snooping
[6], [7], [10]
Silent downgrade to GSM exploiting pre-authentication
messages with rogue base station broadcasting an MCC-
MNC of a network with no public key provisioned in the
USIM.
Location tracking with
RNTI
Location leaks, traffic estima-
tion, service estimation [5]
Potential device location traffic and traffic profiling
Insufficient protection of
DNS traffic at layer 2
DNS hijacking over LTE [5] Man in the middle attacks, credential stealing, remote
malware deployment.
It is of critical importance that the lessons learned from LTE
are applied now to design a 5G system architecture that is
fully resilient to protocol exploits. In other words, 5G security
should be addressed in the current Release 15 as opposed to
in upcoming releases.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Wireless communication security has always been of critical
importance and will be more so as technology evolves towards
5G. Traditionally used mostly for non-critical voice commu-
nication, many of the current and emerging data and control
communication systems that leverage cellular access networks
have stringent requirements in terms of integrity and privacy
of user data. Applications include tactical communication, first
responder ad-hoc networks, and mission-critical IoT.
This paper provides the first holistic analysis of the first
version of the 5G security specifications [12]. Our study
highlights a number of potential insecure protocol edge cases
and limitations that result from infeasible requirements or
assumptions. Despite clearly targeting to address the known
security vulnerabilities of LTE networks, the 5G specifications
are, as of Release 15, Version 1.0.0, still vulnerable to the
same types of LTE adversarial attacks that leverage pre-
authentication messages.
Global adoption and enforcement of a robust security frame-
work is necessary to avoid having to support insecure opera-
tional modes and rely on implicit trust of pre-authentication
messages. Therefore it is critical to ensure that no insecure
edge cases are supported by the 5G standard. In particular, null
authentication, null encryption, downgrade attacks, exploita-
tion of pre-authentication messages, and SUPI catching shall
not be facilitated in any mode of 5G network operation. The
success of such a security framework should not be subject to
implicit assumptions or implementation options neither.
While the 5G security architecture made a substantial leap in
the right direction with the proposed PKI architecture, security
research and development is still necessary to fully address
the known and new security vulnerabilities of next genera-
tion mobile communication systems. Standardization bodies,
researchers, regulators, and industry all need to work together
to accomplish a securer architecture, design, development and
deployment of emerging and future mobile communication
and control systems. Global cooperation and collaboration,
led by the standardization bodies, is necessary to define and
implement the required system architecture and CA that would
provide the foundation for secure 5G systems.
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